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REFORM OF ELECTRICITY PRICING IN THE UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
This Comment explores recently implemented' and proposed re-
forms of electric rate structures. The purpose throughout is to expose
the reader to some of the basic concepts and points of contention in the
area of marginal cost pricing.2 In addition, it aims to provide some of
the source material necessary to deal with what has become a maze of
present-day rate regulation. Since many of the relevant concepts are
"economic" rather than "legal" much of what follows has an economic
bent. In order to structure the analysis and meet these general objec-
tives two questions will be addressed. First, why have traditional pric-
ing practices been challenged? Second, why did the implementation of
pricing reform take the precise form it did, namely, a flat rate per kwh
charge?
I. WHY HAVE TRADITIONAL ELECTRic RATE STRucruREs
BEEN CHALLENGED?
A. Increasing and Decreasing Costs: Their Changing Relationship
Because the long-run historical relationship between average costs
per unit of production and the costs of adding additional units of pro-
duction is in the process of being reversed, traditional pricing prac-
tices of electric utilities have become outmoded, and therefore challeng-
able. Historically, as electric utilities expanded (added additional units
of production), average costs decreased. 3 Presently, it appears that
average costs are increasing with growth in customers, energy consump-
tion, and demand. At best, average costs are now stable. The reasons
for this phenomenon are easily understood from an examination of the
cost position of a utility faced by the need to expand service to an addi-
tional customer.
1. Madison Gas & Elec. Co., No. 2-U-7423 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Aug. 8,
1974).
2. "Marginal cost pricing" or the use of the principles of marginal cost to price
electrical service is posed as the alternative to traditional pricing practices. See dis-
cussion of marginal cost at notes 34-55 infra & accompanying text.
3. This was many times considered to be a universal phenomenon, a special char-
acteristic of a public utility or natural monopoly. For a refutation of this position, see
J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 12-17 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
BONBRIGHT].
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Imagine an average electric utility serving a given number of cus-
tomers, a given number of kilowatt-hours4 [kwh], and a given kilo-
watt5 [kw] demand. What happens to the average cost per service con-
nection when it adds a new customer? The result depends on whether
the average cost of connecting existing customers is greater or less than
the costs incurred in the connection of the new customer.6 If average
costs are higher than the "new-customer" costs, the utility is said to be
in a decreasing cost situation. If average costs are lower, the utility is ex-
periencing increasing costs. If average costs equal "new-customer"
costs, the utility is in a stable cost situation. A similar analysis could
be made of the average cost per kwh or the cost per kw.7
Refinements to this basic concept are made to more precisely iso-
late the nature and cause of increasing or decreasing costs. For instance,
one may want to know whether decreasing or increasing costs are a
long-term or short-term phenomenon. A utility will experience decreas-
ing "short-term" customer costs if a new customer is added within an
established service territory; but, in the "long-term," the addition of
new customers will require significant distribution system expansion
which could cause long-term increasing costs.8 Likewise, if the utility
has a substantial reserve generating capacity, selling an additional kwh
will lower or decrease the average cost per kwh over the short-term.
However, as kwh consumption in the long-term increases, the utility
4. A kilowatt-hour is a measure of energy, or, the product of the power (kw) and
time (hours).
5. A kilowatt is a measure of power, or, the rate of consumption of electricity.
The "demand" made on the system at any point of time is the rate of consumption at
that time. One kilowatt is equal to approximately three-quarters horsepower. Thus, if one
analogizes electric power with automobile power, a kwh is similar to gasoline of known
BTU consumed and kw is the rate of consumption which will vary with horsepower.
6. That is, it depends on whether average costs are higher or lower than "mar-
ginal costs." The concept of marginal cost is explained at note 34 infra. "Marginal cost"
terminology is not employed at this stage for purposes of clarity.
7. Lest a misconception be given at this early stage it should be emphasized that
"new customer" costs do not present a very difficult problem in so far as rate design
is concerned. Regulators need to establish a one-time only "connection charge" to re-
cover these costs. Increasing costs per kw & kwh present more serious problems, and
it is more difficult to charge these costs to the customers who are causally responsible
for them. It should be clear that the rate reform suggested and analysed herein would
not simply charge new customers higher prices to recover the increased customer costs.
Rather, reform in rate design generally seeks to properly recover costs associated with
increased consumption (kwh) and increased use of capacity (kw at system peak).
8. Long-term increasing costs will result if diseconomies of scale, i.e., (if larger
production facilities have higher unit costs than smaller facilities), for example, are
experienced. Of course, if economies of scale (i.e., if larger production facilities have
lower unit costs) and/or growth-induced technological advances are experienced, long-
term decreasing costs will result. This latter state of affairs was the historical experience
of electric utilities. See note 3 supra.
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will have to build new generating plants or purchase power which
could increase the average cost per unit.9
For purposes of economic analysis, one may also want to determine
the precise cause of increasing or decreasing costs. If costs are decreas-
ing, for example, is it due to a deflationary trend, realized economies of
scale,1 technological improvements, or perhaps, improved managerial
efficiency? However, what is of primary importance for purposes of rate
design is that any change in costs must be traced, by cause-effect link,
to the addition of new customers or units of new production. Inflation
may, for instance, raise the average cost per kwh but it may do so
quite independently of whether energy production increases or not.
As a rule, inflation-related cost increases are only relevant to the de-
sign of utility rates if inflation is "felt" more severely in "growth"
situations than in stable systems. 1 Whatever the individual case, it is
the "long-run," growth-stimulated cost increases which are of primary
concern for purposes of rate design.
Electric utilities now appear to be experiencing increasing
rather than decreasing costs over the long-term. The precise reasons
for this phenomen are quite complex, disputed, and consequently, well
beyond the scope of this Comment. However, a general outline of the
recent transformation can be suggested:
1) Economies of scale in the generation of electricity, realized by
the move to larger and larger capacity generating plants in the 1946-
1970 period, have largely been depleted. 2 Most generating units pres-
9. See explanation at note 8 supra.
10. "Economies of scale" are the only phenomena recognized by economists as a
cause of increasing costs. When making a determination of whether an industry or in-
dividual company is experiencing increasing costs, economists will assume a techno-
logical "fix!' and stable factor prices (i.e. real dollars). Given these assumptions, "econ-
omies of scale" is the only one of the four factors mentioned in the text which in-
exorably varies with growth (additional units of production); not over time.
A. E. Kahn's explanation of the economist's treatment of "technological advances"
suggests that in the "regulatory world" the corrolation between technological advances and
cost status of the industry cannot be ignored:
Because the relationship of technological change to the level of output is far
more difficult to specify, predict, or prove than static relationships of cost to
different levels of planned output with a given, known technology or set of
technical alternatives, this type of "economy of scale" is not usually embraced
within the economist's conception of increasing returns. But it is in principle
identical, and in the real, dynamic world may be even more important than the
others.
I A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 127
(1970) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as KAHN].
11. At least, this is the argument made in notes 65-71 infra & accompanying text.
12. E. BERLIN, 0. CiccHnETTI & W. GILLEN, PERSPECTIVE ON POWER 9 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as BERLIN]. Contra, J. FISHER, ENERGY CRISES IN PERSPECTIVE 134-36
(1974).
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ently operating are of optimum capacity. There are also indications
that economies of scale in the transmission of electricity are being de-
pleted.13
2) Environmental control devices are expensive and tend to de-
crease fuel efficiency in plants when installed. This actually has re-
versed some efficiency gains experienced in the recent past.14
3) Delays in the approval of construction and licensing permits
have added significant capital costs to the cost of new generation.',
4) Shutdowns and "slowdowns" in the operation of many new nu-
clear plants increase the costs of adding new capacity.'0
5) The cost of money and inflation tend to feedback on each other.
Not only are utilities paying a higher price for capital, but their cap-
ital requirements are greater. Although this effect would be felt re-
gardless of utility growth, it is one of the arguments of this Comment
that this growth exacerbates the effect of inflation on average costs.
17
6) As will be discussed below, if "external" costs' 8 are considered
as part of total utility costs, electric utilities are currently experiencing
"increasing costs."
To summarize: the historical cost relationship in the industry has
been upset in the recent past. Average total costs are probably now
"increasing" rather than "decreasing," i.e. growth in customers, kwh
of consumption or kw of demand probably raises the average cost per
service, kwh, or kw, respectively. Several factors explain this changed
relationship including exhaustion of economies of scale, internalized
and external environmental costs, regulatory inefficiency and general
13. Olson, Reforming Electricity Rate Structures in the United States, 93 Pun.
UTIL. FoRT., Feb. 14, 1974, at 28, 30 [hereinafter cited as Olson].
14. See BERLIN, supra note 12, at 5; Sporn, On Energy Growth and the Environ-
ment, in ENERGY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 81-88 (S. Schurr ed.
1972).
15. See BERLIN, supra note 12, at 5.
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 3; see notes 65-71 infra & accompanying text. For the view that small
economies of scale are still being experienced in electrical generation but are over-
shadowed by inflation, see Prefiled Testimony of Hans E. Nissel at 15, Proceeding on
motion of the Commission as to rate design for electric corporations, Case 26806 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, case in progress).
18. External costs are the costs of environmental decay and costs of natural
resource waste and depletion not incurred (internalized) by the utility or charged to its
customers. In the words of one writer: "Site shortages, increased pollution, and more
rapid depletion of natural resources are pushing total unit costs of electric production
even higher." Olson, supra note 13, at 30.
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inflation. To further determine why challenges to traditional pricing
policies are warranted, the following discussion will explore the regu-
latory rationale for traditional pricing and contrast it to the principles
of marginal cost.
B. Traditional Electric Rate Structures and Their Rationale
The current practice of designing rates has closely followed the
pricing habit which was fully developed in the 1930's. 19 The
familiar practice is a tariff with three basic classifications: residential,
commercial, and industrial. Each classification is divided into blocks of
consumption that are constructed so that as more units are consumed,
a decreasing price per unit is charged.20 This is commonly called the
"declining block rate structure" or "promotional pricing." Since under
the traditional tariff the average cost per kwh decreases as the customer
consumes larger amounts of electricity, customers, in effect, get a dis-
count if they buy in quantity.
This general structure makes a certain amount of economic sense
in a decreasing cost period. Encouragement of consumption allows the
industry to take full advantage of economies of scale and technological
advances thereby lowering the average cost per unit of sales. Historically,
this rough correspondence between the cost-status of the industry.and
the price mechanism has been primarily a function of chance as op-
posed to design, at least in so far as regulators and regulatory doctrine
are concerned.
In the past, questions concerning the appropriateness of rate struc-
ture were seldom put to the various regulatory bodies in any coherent
form. The utilities were given fairly broad discretion to design rates
and market their product.21 If the revenues generated by the tariff taken
19. For a discussion of the types of pricing structures employed historically, see
R. DAVIDSON, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN SELLING GAS AND ELECTRICITY 76-97 (1955).
20. A traditional residential tariff might read something like this:
First 25 kwh or less: $2.00 per kwh
Next 50 kwh: $ .03
Next 175 kwh: .025
Next 250 kwh: .023
Over 1,000 kwh: .02
21.
In the past promotional rate structures by an electric or gas company
have been challenged primarily by a competitor. The issues have tended to
focus on whether the rate would in fact be beneficial to the utility proposing it
and thereby effect monetary savings to its customers.
To my knowledge until very recently there have been few if any challenges
to the basic proposition that rate structures can and should promote use by
providing for a lower unit charge as the volume of use increases.
S. Freeman, Should Promotional Rates Give Way to Conservation Rates?, in ABA
1975]
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as a whole did not exceed commission-set revenue limits and did not in-
ordinately discriminate against any customer, the utilities were given a
free hand in designing rates. Since any challenge to established rate
design usually came to the regulators on a case-by-case basis and was
sponsored by either a competing utility, energy supplier or a competitor
of an allegedly favored customer, questions were directed to the pro-
priety of a particular classification or the rates charged a particular
class of customers rather than the structure of rates generally.
Additionally, the historical correspondence between cost and price
is accidental given the lack of a fully developed regulatory pricing
principle. Rather than accept and adopt the economic principles of
marginal cost pricing,22 regulatory bodies have, until recently, been
content to work with rule-of-thumb doctrines epitomized by "value of
service" pricing. A brief outline of these rule-of-thumb doctrines fol-
lows.
1. Cost of Service v. Value of Service. The principal support
for any rate structure or rate classification has always stemmed from
considerations of "cost of service"; 23 that is, a given rate structure or
classification system should correspond to the "costs" incurred by the
utility in providing that service.
This concept is not as obvious as it first appears, since at least some
public services, certain roads and public parks for example, are paid for
by the public in general rather than the individual users. Moreover,
public utilities from time to time have been required to perform purely
social functions-such as rural electrification or income redistribution-
which are not priced in relation to costs. 24 For the most part, though,
utility services, like other goods and services, are expected to be mar-
keted for a price which somehow corresponds to the costs of providing
the service. Ultimately, the question arises: What are the "costs" rele-
vant to the pricing of an individual service or the design of a particu-
lar rate structure? Although the answer is not clearcut, the following
example may be useful for its determination.
Suppose a utility in a period of decreasing costs wishes to price a
ANNUAL REPORT, SECTION OF PUBLIC UTILITY LAWV 3 (1971). See also P. GARFIELD &
W. Lovajoy, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONo aos 45 (1964) [hereinafter cited as GARFIELD].
22. Certainly, the regulators' failure to adopt the principles of "marginal cost"
cannot be traced to a lack of a fully-developed economic treatment of the subject.
Bonbright suggests that the concept was developed for application to public works by
the end of the last century. See BONBRIOHT, supra note 3, at 388 n.3.
23. Id. at 67.
24. See, e.g., id. at 109-120.
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new special service classification: residential electric heat.25 If it expects
to sell electricity for this use, the utility must make the price competi-
tive with other fuels, natural gas and fuel oil. How does the regulatory
body determine the cost of service for this new classification? Assuming
that the revenue requirement26 has already been set for this utility by
a separate investigation, average total costs excluding this service are
known. The marginal costs of providing this service, or, the "out-of-
pocket" costs of supplying this additional service, are known. They are
determined by comparing the average total costs excluding this service
with what the average total costs will become when this service is in-
cluded.2 7 The regulatory commission can, on this showing, set a rate to
recover these "marginal" or "out-of-pocket" costs of providing service
to the new class. Are these rates properly based on "cost"? No. Since all
other service classifications produce revenues equal to average total costs
rather than marginal costs there is a discrepancy between the old and
new classifications. Not only will the new classification pay fewer (or
perhaps none) of the joint or common costs of providing service but they
will also take primary advantage of the decreasing cost status of the
industry.28 Since all other rates in the system, taken together, are theo-
retically designed to recover average total costs, rather than marginal
or differential costs and, since they are based on "sunk" or historical
average costs rather than lower projected future costs, the new customers
benefit from a form of rate discrimination. Instead of attempting to
rectify or economically justify this practice,29 the regulatory commis-
25. Electric utilities may wish to promote electric consumption in this manner
for two reasons. First, and correctly, the utility may wish to take maximum advantage
of the decreasing cost status of the industry, or, the decreasing unit costs which wil
result from increased consumption of this type at a particular time (e.g., spreading high
fixed costs among more units). Second, it may be provoked to do so by the nature
of the regulatory environment itself. This latter possibility is the Averch-Johnson effect,
or, the tendency that companies which are allowed a fixed percentage return on net
investment will expand net investment and maximize dollar profits.
26. The "revenue requirement" is "the revenue total that the utility is authorized
to collect for sales of an estimated volume of service." GARFiELD, supra note 21, at 44. It
is equal to the total of: "(a) proper operating expenses; (b) depreciation expense; (c)
taxes; and (d) a reasonable return on the net valuation of property [rate base]." Id.
Note that a utility is not guaranteed revenues equal to its revenue requirement; it is
simply given the opportunity to earn sufficient revenues.
27. These are defined as the "differential" costs of providing the service. Since
most of the costs of providing electric service are "joint" (they are economically pro-
duced in fixed proportions) or "common" (facilities are shared by different customers
and classes), it is impossible to allocate costs "as one might divide a pie among the mem-
bers of a dinner party." BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 299.
28. See id. at 298-301, particularly at 300 n.11; KAHN, supra note 10, at 77-83,
134-36.
29. In certain circumstances this practice may be economically justified. For
instance, if the customers carrying the burden of higher rates have a low price elasticity
1975]
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sions developed a convenient doctrine--"value of service" pricing-
which would support pricing similar to that proposed in the preceding
example.
Value of service pricing is the regulatory justification for a rate
based not solely upon cost but, in part, upon the price which a given
customer is willing to pay. It is the practice of charging a rate based on
various price elasticities of demand,30 or, in lay terms, charging "what
the traffic will bear." In the above example, the residential heating cus-
tomer has a relatively high price elasticity since he or she can easily
forego the use of electricity and heat with alternative fuels. Therefore,
he or she, by virtue of the value of service doctrine, will be charged a
promotional rate or a relatively low price for service.
Value of service pricing is discriminatory in the economic sense
since it more often than not results in charging "one customer ... a
higher price than another for the identical product or service." 31 How-
ever, it does not dearly fall under the legal rule against rate discrim-
ination which prohibits charging a different rate to customers "simi-
larly situated" 2 and/or operating a given service at a loss to the detri-
ment of other ratepayers.33
The inaccuracy of the historical practice of utility price-setting
stems from its failure to trace costs consistently throughout the utili-
ties tariff. When inconsistencies in cost analysis are pointed out, value
of service pricing, or rate discrimination in the economic sense, is a
convenient rationale to "justify" deviations from strictly cost-based rates.
of demand compared to the preferred customers and the regulators deem it of primary
importance that the utility meet its revenue requirement, it might be quite proper to
give those customers said to be "buying at the margin" the benefit of preferential rates.
See BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 369-85; KAHN, supra note 10, at 142-46.
30. Price elasticity of demand, in the regulatory meaning of the term, is the simple
qualitative effect of price changes on demand. Elastic demands respond to changes in
price; inelastic demands are insensitive to price. It does not directly correlate to the
economists' definition, namely, the percentage increase in price over the percent decrease
in demand. The following illustration points out the difference between the economists'
and the regulators' definition of price elasticity. Suppose a 10% price increase is imposed
on a class of utility customers. The question is: How will they react to a price increase?
To the economist there are three possibilities:
1) change in demand 0 to minus 9.99% (inelastic);
2) change in demand minus 10% (point of unit price elasticity);
3) change in demand from minus 10.01% to minus 100% (elastic).
To the regulators there are only two:
4) zero change in demand (inelastic);
5) some negative change in demand (elastic).
See, e.g., Prefiled Testimony of A. Noel Doherty at 4-5, New York Telephone Co., Case
26775. (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 1975).
31. BERLIN, supra note 12, at 15.
32. See id.
33. Id.
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To eliminate these half-way attempts at cost of service pricing and to
end unjustified discriminatory pricing, critics of traditional pricing pro-
pose a complete regulatory endorsement of the principles of marginal
cost pricing. The following should acquaint the reader with these pric-
ing principles.
2. Marginal Cost as a Basic Pricing Rationale. Marginal cost is
the cost of producing an additional unit of a given product. It is the
increase in total costs resulting from a relatively small increase in the
rate of output, or, stated negatively, it is the reduction in total costs
caused by a relatively small decrease in output.3 Defined in this man-
ner, it is a very general and imprecise term. It could refer to a 0.1% or
a 10% increase or decrease in the rate of output. The change in the
rate of output could be sustained over one minute or over a number of
years. Ideally, one would want to price at short-run marginal cost85
[SRMG] (the costs experienced by adding an additional unit of output
for a very short duration) because it would best allow for the efficient
allocation of resources, optimize the use of existing capacity and, in
short, equal the price which would be charged under "perfect compe-
tition."3 6
Students have been indoctrinated into the concept of SRMC with
a hypothetical, recast as follows: 37 One minute to take-off from New
York, a passenger runs aboard a 747 jet which has at least one vacant
seat. What is the SRMC of taking him to London? Answer: practically
nothing--only the fuel cost of carrying an additional 165 lb. man and
34. See KAHN, supra note 10, at 65-66.
35. Id. at 75.
36. See id. at 66-67. Kahn points out that the allocation of resources is "optimal"
under marginal-cost pricing if one accepts certain "assumptions or value judgements."
Id. at 67. Assumption one: the allocation of resources is optimal only if one accepts
the consumer choices which are made in the market place. Assumption two: the result
is "optimal only if one is willing to place a similar evaluation on the distribution of
income . . . which decides how many dollar votes each buyer has." Id. In addition, Kahn
identifies two corollaries to the marginal cost principle which also affect resource allo-
cation. Corollary one: the price must reflect all of the costs of production. This means
that social or external costs must be included in price (for example, air pollution costs)
and not simply the costs borne by the transacting parties. Id. at 69. Corollary two: the
rule will not produce optimal results if it is not followed uniformly throughout the
economy. That is, if some goods are priced at marginal costs and others are priced at
less than or greater than marginal costs, a less than "optimum" resource allocation will
result. Id.
Although these four points taken together initially appear to make "minced meat"
out of the marginal cost pricing principle, they can be circumvented by appropriate
measures. These assumptions and corollaries, however, do make the task of rate design one
of "improving" rather than "optimizing." The economists can offer us no panaceas.
37. Liberally adapted from id. at 75. Also note the use of a similar hypothetical
in Dessus, Rate-Fixing in Public Utilities, in MARGINAL COST PICING IN PRACTICE 43
(J. Nelson ed. 1964).
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20 lbs. of luggage, plus lunch and dinner. As a corollary, any fee charged
the passenger over and above the marginal cost of flying him to London
is profit38 to the airlines, or can be used to lower the average cost charged
other customers.39 The principle of SRMC can be applied, theoretically
at least, to the pricing of electricity.
First, the SRMC per kwh would be determined by the relationship
between the time of consumption and the system peak. If the additional
unit is desired when the system has sufficient reserve generation capacity
available for the production of an additional kwh the only cost would
be the cost of fuel needed to produce it. The situation is analogous to
the plane in New York waiting with a seat that would otherwise go
empty. On the other hand, if the additional unit is desired at the time
the system is generating at full capacity, the additional unit would cost
the customer the "market-clearing price," i.e., the price at which an-
other customer would be willing to "drop out" or be denied service. 40
This price would be many times the cost to serve at off-peak times.
Second, SRMC would depend on the customer's exact location
within the system. The SRMC would be correlated to the extent of
system utilization at that particular point. If the customer took the in-
crement just above the capacity of the local distribution system, his
cost would equal the "market-clearing price."
As can be seen even from this sketchy illustration, SRMC pricing
can become quite unwieldly. To effectuate it properly, the utility would
essentially have to become a metering department with an adjunct elec-
trical supply subsidiary to accurately account for all the cost-variables
associated with SRMC pricing. The feedback and informational system
requirements would require significant capital outlays.41 For this reason,
SRMC pricing, by itself, has never been proposed as a viable alternative
to present practices.4 One compromise solution to the practical prob-
lem of implementing marginal-cost pricing is to set prices on the basis of
38. "Marginal cost", when speaking of a public utility, is defined to include "rate
of return" as well as other expenses. Therefore, "profit" in the context of the above
discussion means "revenues in excess of the allowed rate of return."
39. "That is why the youth fare plan was an inspiration, at least for the (young)
flying public: it offered them the option of traveling at greatly reduced fares on seats
that would otherwise go unused." KAHN, supra note 10, at 76. One could say the same
thing, of course, for the presently offered "no-frill" service.
40. Id. at 104 n.47; BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 322-23.
41. Because these feedback capabilities can be attained with relative ease by
computers, it has been suggested that SRMC could be used to price the use of computer
time. KAHN, supra note 10, at 108.
42. See BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 323. Of course, both SRMC & LRMC have
application to the pricing of electric service. As will be discussed in the text of Section
II, part B, the foundation for time-of-day pricing is SRMC.
(Vol. 25
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long-run incremental costs [LRIG] which are defined as those costs.
which can "reasonably be expected to be added in the next several
years." 43 They are termed "long run" because they are based on a dura-
tion of several years, as opposed to literally seconds when measuring
SRMC. They are "incremental" because they estimate the costs of
larger increases in output than required when measuring SRMC.
The difference between SRMC and LRIG is not a difference in
theory; it is a difference in measurement. When measuring LRIC the
cost of additional capacity is included. It is equal to the cost of the
additional facilities (an additional airplane in our 747 hypothetical or
an additional generation unit when speaking of an electric utility)
which are expected to be added over the next several years in order to
meet increasing demand."
The cost of additional capacity is never included in the measure-
ment of SRMC. There are two possibilities: First, when reserve capac-
ity exists (as in our 747 hypothetical) no capacity costs whatsoever are
included in SRMC on the theory that the installed capacity would
otherwise be standing idle. The SRMC, as has been illustrated, is equal
to the costs which vary with the short-term additional usage (e.g., fuel
costs). Second, where capacity is being utilized at its absolute limit, the
costs of additional capacity45 are not included on the theory that this
additional capacity will not be added over the short-term. Rather, the
SRMC is equal to a price which would be high enough to force a cus-
tomer who is already utilizing the capacity to drop out of the market.
Quite literally then, if the hypothetical passenger runs aboard the 747
and finds no remaining seats, the pilot could auction the seats on the
plane. When the price is bid which forces a passenger off the plane, this
would be the SRMC to our hypothetical passenger.4 Since LRIC in-
cludes the costs of providing required additional capacity expected to
43. Madison Gas & Elec. Co., No. 2-U-7423, at 4-5 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Aug.
8, 1974). The commissions that have adopted the principle of LRIC have used the
"planning period" or a period of five to ten years to calculate LRIC. Prefiled Testimony
of Charles H. Frazier, entitled Long-Run Incremental Costs at 10, 19 & 20, Proceeding
on the motion of the Commission as to rate design for electric corporations, Case 26806
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, case in progress).
44. New capacity is added in an optimal fashion when LRIC is equal to the
SRMC of the installed capacity or the marginal cost of potential overloading. To avoid
volatile prices, however, the appropriate marginal costs have to be projected over the
planning period. Dessus, Rate-Fixing in Public Utilities, in MARGINAL COST PRICING IN
PRACTICE 44 (J. Nelson ed. 1964).
45. KAHN, supra note 10, at 70. For proof that installed capacity costs are recovered
from SMRC pricing, see Prefiled Testimony of Sally Hunt Streiter, Proceeding on the
motion of the Commission as to rate design for electric corporations, Case 26806 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, case in progress).
46. See KAHN, supra note 10, at 104-05 n.48.
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be incurred over the foreseeable future, it avoids the problem of price
volatility which would arise from implementation of SRMC pricing.
To measure LRIC for an electric utility, system costs are commonly
divided into three elements: energy, demand (capacity), and customer.47
Energy costs are the cost of primary fuels: the coal, oil, gas, or uranium
used to produce electricity. They are higher for less efficient plants
(peak load plants) than base load plants, 48 but otherwise vary directly
with kwh consumed. Customer costs are the costs of service line, meter,
billing, and the like. They vary directly with the number of customers.
Capacity costs are the hardest to determine. They are the costs of the
generation and distribution facilities. They are charged to those who
use energy at the system's peak.49
If, for present purposes, a simplifying assumption is made that
long-run costs are equal to the current average costs per unit of produc-
tion, a model tariff utilizing LRIC can be suggested.5 0 The tariff would
include a fixed monthly charge to recover customer costs,51 a flat rate
charge (or nearly flat rate) to recover energy costs, and an additional
charge for energy consumed at system peak to recover capacity costs.
The experienced costs for each of the three elements could be allo-
cated among the various categories of customers and the level of rates
for each class or category could be determined. 2
It should be noted however, that a very critical assumption was
made above, namely, that future costs would be equal to current costs
of production. This relationship between average current costs and
future costs rarely holds. More often than not future costs will either
be decreasing, as was the case prior to 1970, or increasing, as may be
the present situation.53 This state of affairs is a nightmare for utility
47. See Olson, supra note 13, at 29.
48. Plants which operate at peak usually have higher energy costs and lower capac-
ity costs than base load plants. A nuclear facility is probably the best example of
a present-day base load plant. A gas turbine or pump storage facility represents the typ-
ical peak load plant. See BERLIN, supra note 12, at 34-36.
49. More precisely, they are charged to those who consume during "periods which
approach or reach available capacity and not simply maximum capacity." Id. at 31.
50. This is essentially the tariff instituted in Madison. One might also suggest im-
plementation of this tariff as an interim improvement over the declining block rate
structure even if LRIC do not equal average costs. See BERLIN, supra note 12, at 46-50.
51. Olson points out that initially each customer should pay a connection charge
"that covers the cost of connecting his premises to the distribution network." Olson,
supra note 13, at 29. This "connection" charge would be a one-time phenomenon and
essentially covers the possibility that costs per service connection are increasing as pointed
out by the example at note 7 supra & accompanying text.
52. As pointed out by Berlin and others, cost variations and hence price differentials
between customer categories "impl[y] that the variation in cost between customer cate-
gories is greater than the variaiion within categories." BERLIN, supra note 12, at 47.
53. See discussion of increasing costs Section 1, part A infra.
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regulators. Part of their responsibility, and perhaps their primary one,
is to assure the utility a reasonable rate of return, which means the
avoidance of both revenue shortfalls and windfalls.54 Yet, when rates
are set equal to marginal cost, resultant revenues will be less than the
properly determined revenue requirement in times of decreasing costs
and higher than the revenue requirement in increasing cost periods:
How the Wisconsin Commission resolved this dilemma is, in part, the
subject of Section II of this Comment.
The preceding discussion suggests a final answer to the question
posed at the outset: Why have traditional pricing practices been chal-
lenged? The promotional rates offered under traditional pricing prac-
tices probably mirrored marginal costs to a significant degree and at the
same time served an important function in expanding the use of elec-
tricity in times of decreasing costs. Value of service and related doc-
trines, although not comprehensive, were useful in that they generated
promotional rates. Additionally, in their own uncanny way, traditional
pricing practices allowed the regulatory body to set rates at promo-
tional levels without having to confront the possibility of revenue
shortfalls.
As soon as electric utilities began to experience increasing costs,.
however, the promotion of electricity consumption (whether via the
declining block rate structure or preferential rates for special service
classifications) served only to exaggerate increases in the average cost
per unit of production because the utilities were forced to expand at a
faster rate than was cost-justified. At the same time, the traditional
pricing doctrines, which had once worked adequately, failed to provide
the tools necessary to bring rates into line with the changing cost situa-
tion of electric utilities. In fact, these doctrines only served to perpetu-
ate pricing practices totally unsuited to the utilities' changing cost.
status. Unless rate discrimination and further disparity between the:
real costs of service and price are to be tolerated, rates must be set
equal to, if not returned to, the marginal costs of providing service.
This means at least two separate adjustments must be considered: 5
1) Rates should be set equal to LRIC rather than historical, or-
54. The "level" of, rates is set to provide the utility with an opportunity to meet
its "revenue requirement" including a fair rate of return as defined in note 26 supra.
Since the "revenue requirement" is determined with respect to historical costs, whether-
past historical costs as incurred, or the "reproduction cost" (current cost of historical'
investment) or "fair value" (some mix of the two), it should be anticipated that rates.
set equal to LRIC, since they would consider future costs, will deviate from the com-,
mission-determined revenue requirement.
55. Several other steps could of course be suggested. For instance, as suggested by-
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"sunk" average costs of service. Otherwise, the real costs of service,
avoidable future costs, will not be propery reflected in rates.
2) If regulatory bodies are required to deviate from strict marginal
cost pricing for the purpose of bringing total revenues to acceptable
levels, they should attempt to do so in a method best compatible with
both the principles of marginal cost and their regulatory authority.
These steps necessary for the implementation of marginal cost pric-
ing are explored in a discussion of a recent case."
II. IMPLEMENTING PRICING REFORM-THE MADISON CASE
Madison Gas and Electric Company (hereinafter referred to as
MG&E or Company) is an intermediate-sized combination utility serv-
ing primarily residential customers in Madison, Wisconsin, and nearby
suburbs. On March 3, 1972, it filed an application with the Public
Service Commission of Wisconsin for an increase in gas and electric
rates. Testimony was presented by the Company and the principal in-
tervenors, Capital Community Center-Environmental Defense Fund,
on the issue of electric rate design. The applicant and intervenors gen-
erally agreed that marginal cost pricing should be adopted as the basic
principle of electric rate design, and both agreed that the only practical
way to implement marginal cost pricing in electric rate structures is to
base rates on long-run incremental costs [LRIC]. 57 Testimony was also
introduced on the relative merits of peak load pricing. 8 The major
controversy, however, centered on the specific problems of LRIC meas-
urement and the consequences of LRIC pricing when operating within
a revenue constraint.5 9
Almost two years after the date of filing, the Wisconsin Commis-
sion, having allowed the Company two temporary rate increases, closed
the record of the case. On August 8, 1974, the Commission issued an
order which prescribed general rules for rate design in Wisconsin and
our example of residential electric space heating, it is important that thorough-going
cost of service analysis be done systemwide for many utilities. In other words, rates for
all service classifications should be set equal to marginal costs. Joint and common costs
should be properly allocated. This would avoid the rate discrimination which results
when some customers are charged marginal or differential costs and others are charged
to recover average total costs.
56. Madison Gas & Elec. Co., No. 2-U-7423 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Aug. 8,
1974) [hereinafter cited as MG&E].
57. See notes 42-55 supra & accompanying text. The significance of this concession
by the utility should not be underestimated.
58. See notes 86-92 infra & accompanying text.
59. See notes 61-85 infra & accompanying text.
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directed that MG&E, together with other Wisconsin electric utilities,
begin to study the feasibility of peak load pricing.
Rate making has been aptly described as the art of workable
compromise.60 In this respect, Madison does not differ from thousands
of its predecessors. However, the subsidiary issues which were resolved
before the decision was reached and the plan implemented differed
from those in traditional rate cases. Their resolution is important not
only-because it supports an interim or stopgap marginal cost pricing ex-
periment (the flat rate per kwh charge with a summer-winter price dif-
ferential), but also because it sheds light upon the problems which im-
pede the establishment of a more refined system of marginal cost pric-
ing. Three of these subsidiary issues-LRIC and the revenue require-
ment, time of day and pricing, and economic impact-provide the focus
for the following discussion of the Madison case. It will be shown that
the Commission's resolution and consideration of these particular issues
largely determined the "interim nature" of the implemented reforms.
A. LRIC and the Revenue Requirement'
A utility's "revenue requirement," 6' or the Commission-determined
level of revenues to be generated by a utility's tariff is measured by
its operating expenses, including depreciation, plus a reasonable return
on its rate base (net investment, however determined, minus accrued de-
preciation). As has been noted, in times of increasing costs, when rates
are set equal to LRIC, they will produce a revenue surplus. The utility
will be earning more than its reasonable revenue requirement. Con-
versely, in times of decreasing costs, rates set equal to LRIC will fail to
produce sufficient revenues to meet the revenue requirement. 2
In the Madison case, projected revenues from the proposed LRIC
pricing scheme were compared to the revenue requirement and were
found to be approximately equal. The Commission, therefore, was led
to conclude that, at least insofar as Madison Gas and Electric is con-
cerned, it "cannot be experiencing 'increased costs.'" 63
This somewhat "fortuitous" e finding did support the ultimate
60. See BONBRiGHT, supra note 3, at 386.
61. Defined supra note 26.
62. See note 54 supra & accompanying text.
63. MG&E at 8.
64.
In the instant case this inherent discrepancy between revenue requirement
needs and marginal costs was apparently resolved by demonstrating a rough
arithmetic equivalence between revenues expected to be generated by rates
based on marginal costs and revenues required to provide an adequate return
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result: a summer period flat rate per kwh charge. However, the finding
that MG&cE was in a "stable cost" situation allowed the Commission to
circumvent the otherwise necessary and difficult dilemma: How does
one set rates equal to marginal cost and at the same time continue to
work within a revenue constraint? Before reviewing proposed solutions
to this dilemma, it is appropriate to consider two steps in the Commis-
sion's analysis which largely determined this finding. Had the Commis-
sion treated the issues of inflation and externalities differently, it would
have found that MG&E is indeed experiencing increasing costs, and it
would have had to face squarely the marginal cost/revenue constraint
dilemma.
1. Inflation. The Company's cost allocation study divided the cost
to serve under three headings: customer, capacity (demand), and energy
costs. 65 Ignoring the relatively uncontroversial problems associated with
the allocation of certain costs between the categories (e.g., what portion
of distribution costs should be attributed to capacity and what portion
to customer?), significant dispute arose concerning the estimate of future
capacity costs. Should future capacity costs be estimated in current dol-
lars or should they incorporate an allowance for inflation? The Com-
mission determined that the former estimate of future costs was ap-
propriate:
These future [capacity] costs are estimated on the basis of expected ex-
penses adjusted to the current price level of actual additions to plant
anticipated by the utility.60
Applicant's estimate of future costs in terms of current dollars is con-
sistent with the economic definition of long-run costs.07
However, the Commission's use of current dollars to measure
LRIC was largely premised on its acceptance of a very limited defini-
tion of "increasing costs" and a fine distinction between "increasing
costs" caused by additional output and "cost increases" due to infla-
tion.
The reasons initially cited in support of the claim that MG&E is
in an "increasing cost" situation centered on arguments showing his-
torical increases in generating cost per kwh, which confounds the no-
tions of "increasing costs" due to increased production versus "cost
increases" due to other factors such as inflation.08
to the enterprise. We may only hope that, in addition to being fortuitous, this
equivalence is well-founded.
MG&E at 32 (Comm'r Cudahy, concurring).
65. MG&E at 5.
66. MG&E at 5 (emphasis added).
67. MG&E at 6.
68. MG&E at 8.
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Although it is true that "increasing costs" cannot be proven by a
showing of "historical increases in generating costs per kwh," it is
equally evident that the "increasing cost"/"cost increases" distinction6 9
made and accepted by the Wisconsin Commission does little to solve
the problem of exactly how inflation-related cost increases should be
treated. Since inflation affects both the costs of maintaining an ongoing
no-growth utility system and the costs incurred in expanding that sys-
tem, it appears that the distinction between "cost increases" due to in-
flation and "increasing costs" stemming from additional production
does not demarcate two, independent, cost categories; rather, there is
an overlap. To state the problem negatively: some inflation-related cost
increases could be avoided if the utility system does not add units of
production.
Thus, it appears that the issue, at least on the microeconomic
level, 70 is the same as many others in LRIC determination and cost
allocation: Who is responsible for the increased costs? Who should bear
the brunt of inflation-those users who necessitate the need for added
expenditures with inflated dollars or all customers? The author's con-
clusion is that those customers who are responsible for the utility's
69. The opinion points out that intervenors eventually accepted this latter distinc-
tion. Their acceptance was probably based on the observations of Irwin M. Stelzer:
"It is important that the Commission not fall into the trap which seems to have ensnared
Professor Olson [economic witness for the intervenors], namely, the logical fallacy of
thinking that because the Company's average unit costs have increased over time, that
this increase has resulted from growth in customer demands .... ." Prefiled testimony of
Irwin M. Stelzer at 17, MG&E (emphasis added). However, the intervenors could have
refined their definition, in line with the suggestions in the test below, and satisfied the
definition of "increasing costs" proposed by Dr. Stelzer.
As a practical matter, it is clearly preferable to use this Commission's de-
termination of average total cost, rather than the definition of pure theory.
I would then here use the term "increasing costs" to refer to a situation in which
an increase in output will result in an increase in cost of service per unit of
output. Correspondingly, "decreasing costs" would refer to a decrease in cost
of service per unit of output.
Id. at 14-15.
This definition of increasing and decreasing costs has been used throughout the
present analysis and in the introductory paragraphs of this Comment. See notes 3-18
supra & accompanying text. It should be noted that the opinion itself is particularly un-
clear and unhelpful in this regard. The Commission states that MG&E "cannot be ex-
periencing 'increasing costs' as defined by economists." MG&E at 8 (emphasis added).
We have just seen, however, that Dr. Stelzer rejected the dictates of "pure theory" and
suggested that the Commission use its own "determination of average total costs" and,
presumably, what may be referred to as a "regulatory definition" of increasing costs.
Thus, a terrible paradox: Regulators accepted an "economic" definition of terms despite
the fact that the economic expert advocated a "regulatory definition."
70. The foregoing ignores any of the macroeconomic effects which could result
from charging the costs of future inflation to certain users. Suffice it to say that if fu-
ture inflation is included in LRIC, it may have the effect of increasing the general level
of inflation in the local economy.
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need to expand, in the case of generation capacity additions, the users
at system peak, should bear the brunt of inflation. Practically speaking,
if the above observations are correct, the effect of anticipated inflation
on the utility can be divided into two components: unavoidable, non-
growth-related inflation costs and avoidable, growth-related inflation
costs. The latter of these two components should be included, at least
in part, in the calculation of LRIC. Had the Wisconsin Commission
included inflation-related cost increases in this manner, it would have
undoubtedly reached the conclusion that MG&cE was experiencing "in-
creasing costs."71
2. External Costs. External costs are those costs which society in-
curs in the production of a product, such as costs of unavoidable en-
vironmental decay, which are not directly borne by the producers or
users of the product. The question presented in the Madison case was
whether these costs should be included in the price charged for elec-
tricity, and, if so, to what extent. If external costs are included in a
utility's rates, the rates will generate revenues in excess of a reasonable
revenue requirement.7 2 If external costs are ignored, a misallocation
of resources will result because the full cost to society is not reflected in
the price, and consequently, more energy is consumed than would be
otherwise.73 In Madison, both the Company and intervenor witnesses
favored the inclusion, to a greater or lesser extent, of external costs in
the calculation of LRIC.74 The Commission, however, took exception
71. It is interesting to note that when marginal cost pricing was implemented in
France, inflation also played the role of the "great equalizer." At that time, the French
industry was said to be experiencing "decreasing costs" (in the economic sense). Rather
than charging true marginal costs in this situation, and suffering a revenue shortfall, the
French authorities found that by including the effect of inflation in their cost determina-
tions, rates could be set to recover average total costs. Boiteux, Electric Energy: Facts,
Problems and Prospects, in MARGINAL COST PRICING IN P cTic 26 (J. Nelson ed.
1964).
We can summarize this phenomenon simply. In times of decreasing costs, include the
effect of inflation in any cost determinations; in times of increasing costs, ignore infla-
tion. In either case, one will successfully avoid the revenue constraint/marginal cost
pricing dilemma.
72. Since this discussion is limited to the "revenue surplus" problem or the reve-
nue constraint/marginal cost pricing dilemma, it is quite proper to ignore the issue of
whether external costs are increasing, decreasing or stable. Once externalities are charged,
a revenue surplus will result, no matter what the peculiar characteristics of external
costs may be. However, the question of whether external costs are increasing, stable or
decreasing is crucial when issues of rate design or cost causality are being considered. For
instance, if external costs are increasing they should be charged to those customers who
are responsible for their incurrence and who necessitate increased output.
73. Assuming, of course, that external costs are included in the determination of
price throughout the economy. If this is not true or only partially true, the precise ef-
fect on consumption is difficult to determine.
74. MG&E at 8, 9.
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to their recommendation. First, the Commission recognized that the
best way to recover external costs would be to impose a tax on utility
operations, a method which would require a legislative action.75 Second,
the Commission was concerned that if electric rates are set to recover
external costs an uneconomic shift of resources may result. Since other
energy sources do not necessarily include external costs, it reasoned,
customers might substitute other energy sources for "fully-priced" 76
electricity.
Although the Commission's concern is well-grounded in economic
theory,77 it is of little significance in today's energy market. Recent rises
in petroleum prices suggest that perhaps even more than external costs
are being assessed. The end of government tax "subsidies" for oil de-
pletion, the imposition of an oil import tariff, the proposed decontrol
of some oil wells, the operation of the O.P.E.C. cartel and the oil
executive's assertions that price increases in oil are designed to raise
capital for continued exploration are examples of this recent trend. All
of these factors indicate that oil, at least, is being priced at or near "full-
cost," including external costs. There are indications, 78 too, that coal
prices have risen in relation to the price of oil, thereby possibly re-
flecting "full costs." The other energy alternative, natural gas, presents
more complex problems. However, it is safe to assert that it, too, poses
little threat of becoming an underpriced competitor of electricity.
Moreover, even if the misallocation fears were supported by fact
they could have been markedly reduced by a proper and careful inclu-
sion of external costs. Electricity is, for the most part, a by-product
of the primary fuels. If the external costs associated with primary fuel
75. This method is discussed at Section II, part A (3) infra.
76. "Fully-priced" means a price reflecting both external and internal costs, i.e.,
full marginal costs.
77. Marginal cost pricing of one commodity will not produce optimum results if
other commodities are not priced at marginal cost (for whatever reason). See KAHN,
supra note 10, at 69.
78. Coal prices rose quite sharply in response to the 1973 oil embargo and the
November 1974 coal strike. Price rises as high as 800% were experienced during these
periods. Arnold, Renaissance of Coal Brings Booming Days to Appalachian Hills, The
Wall St. J., April 8, 1975, at 1, col. 6. In fact, in the 1973-74 period, the price
of coal rose at a faster rate than that of oil and natural gas. It is projected, how-
ever, that the relative price of coal will return to its historic pattern and be priced at
about 35% of the price of oil on a British Thermal Unit basis. STAFF OF THE AD Hoc
COMMITTEE ON THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY EFFECT OF ENERGY
AND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCE PRICING OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., ENERGY SECURITY AND THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY:
IMPACT ON PRICES, EMPLOYMENT, AND CONSUMPTION 9-10 (Comm. Print 1974). The
Council on Wage and Price Stability is presently investigating the 80% price increase in
coal which has occurred over the past two years. The Wall St. J., June 27, 1975, at 7,
col. 2.
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production (e.g., the external costs of strip mining coal) and conversion
(e.g., the external costs of burning fossil fuels) are not charged to elec-
tricity consumers and all other external costs are charged, there is little
possibility of misallocation. 9 In other words, the Commission could
have recognized external costs attributable to the production of electric
energy to the extent they exceed the external costs of other energy
alternatives. If it would have done so, misallocation fears would have
been, for all practical purposes, nonexistent.80
One may conclude that the Commission's reluctance to incorporate
external costs into LRIC is merely a temporary expedient. In future
cases, when the Commission is presented with a mechanism to tax these
external costs, and appropriate methods such as those suggested above
are provided to estimate them, they will be reflected in the price of
electrical service.
3. The Problem of Excess Revenues. As suggested in the preceding
discussion, the Wisconsin Commission went to great lengths to reach
its conclusion that MGcE was in a stable cost situation. It easily could
have found "increasing costs" and a revenue surplus. It declined to do
so, however, for reasons which will soon become evident.
In general, there are three methods by which the Commission
could have fronted the marginal cost/revenue constraint dilemma. As-
suming a revenue surplus, the Commission could have (1) asked the
legislature to levy a tax on excess utility revenues (option A), or (2) it
could have adjusted total revenues to reasonable levels by charging a
price equal to LRIC for the most elastic services and customer classes
and a proportionally lower price for less elastic services and classes,
i.e., employ the inverse elasticity rule8 l (option B), or (3) it could have
lowered all LRIC-determined rates by an equal percentage (option C).
Although each of these options has its share of positive and nega-
79. This is because external costs would be charged to consumers of electricity only
to the extent that these costs are greater than the external costs associated with alterna-
tive fuels. Simply, if one were to assume that the external costs per kwh were .06 cents
and .1 cent for oil and electricity, respectively, only the difference, i.e., .04 cents per kwh
would be charged to electricity consumers. This is only one of several ways to approximate
true marginal cost pricing in a system where prices of substitute commodities do not in-
clude external costs. Examples of the external costs which might be charged under this
scheme include the costs arising from the energy-inefficient conversion of fossil fuels into
electric energy and the external costs of nuclear generation.
80. See generally G. GARvEY, ENERGY, ECOLOGY, ECONOmY 39-59 (1972).
81. Generally, the inverse elasticity rule provides that customers ,or services should
be charged a price in relation to their price elasticity of demand. Customers and services
with the highest elasticity of demand are priced at their marginal costs. Others are
charged a lower (higher) rate in proportion to their price elasticities so that the reason-
able revenue requirement is recovered in times of increasing (decreasing) costs.
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tive attributes, option B is usually acclaimed as the most acceptable."2
It is easily adaptable to present regulatory practices in that the legis-
lature need not be consulted (as would be required for option A). It
also causes less disruption of the desired economic result than option C
because those classifications or levels of consumption which are most
responsive to price or most elastic are priced at marginal cost. Option C
would require charging less than marginal cost for all classifications
and consumption levels.
Though superior to all other possibilities, option B, employing
the inverse elasticity rule, has its own drawbacks. It represents a partial
reversion to the value of service rationale for rate-making.8 In times
of increasing costs, therefore, a disproportionate burden falls exclusively
on those with the most elastic demands. Moreover, if this rationale is
followed to its logical conclusion it may, under certain conditions, dic-
tate an "inverted rate" structure.s4 This result by itself might serve to
explain the reluctance of the Wisconsin Commission to carry out its
analysis to its limits.
It can be concluded, therefore, that whatever option the Wisconsin
Commission adopted, only a "second-best" approximation to marginal-
cost pricing could be obtained. Thus, no sooner did the Commission
endorse the basic principles of marginal cost pricing then it was forced
to deviate from them. Since a finding of "increasing costs" or excess
revenues would have involved the Commission in problems of greater
complexity, it was avoided.
It should be emphasized that despite the preceding critique of the
Madison opinion, the finding of stable costs is consistent with the rate
structure implemented by the Wisconsin Commission. Because utility
costs should be charged to customers who are causally responsible for
their incurrence, and since in a stable cost situation the average cost
per kwh is constant over the whole range of consumption, it is appro-
priate to charge a uniform rate per kwh for consumption during the
summer peak period.85
82. It has been supported by A. E. Kahn, Chairman of the N.Y. Public Service
Commission, in a recent article. Kahn, Between Theory and Practice: Reflections of a
Neophyte Public Utility Regulator, 95 PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 2, 1975, at 32.
83. BONBRIGHT, supra note 3, at 375-85.
84. An inverted rate-structure refers to a structure where tail blocks are priced
higher than the initial blocks of the tariff. It is called "inverted" because it inverts the
block relationships of presently used declining block rate structures. This structure may
result if the inverse elasticity rule is applied because it is thought that the lower blocks
are most inelastic and under the rule would receive the benefit of the revenue excess
generated by the tail blocks.
85. Moreover, it should be noted that the Commission did advance the regulatory
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B. Time-of-Day Pricing
One of the fears in moving from a declining block rate structure
to a flat rate structure is that an underutilization of existing plant capac-
ity may result. The solution, as adopted by the Wisconsin Commis-
sion, is to study the feasibility of time-of-day pricing.8 0 It is anticipated
that this pricing scheme can be implemented for large users in the near
future. Under time-of-day pricing, off-peak users would be charged a
price substantially lower than peak users on the theory that they are
not responsible for any capacity costs.87
Historically, United States electrical utilities have done little in
the way of rate structuring to even out demand. The small efforts which
have been made are deficient. For example, electrical utilities have used
various schemes to promote the use of off-peak service including special
nighttime water heating rates and interruptable service. These special
tariff provisions, although they improve load factor somewhat, are none-
theless deficient in that they do not provide for appropriate peak-usage
penalties. On a much larger scale, but in an equally deficient manner,
industrial and commercial customers have usually been served on a
two-part tariff which imposes separate charges for demand (kw) and
energy (kwh). This rate schedule is employed to encourage the large
customers to level out the demand they impose on the system in any
given half hour or hour period. The problem is, however, that if indi-
vidual customers "shave" their own peaks, there is no guarantee that
the system peak likewise will be affected. That is, two industrial cus-
tomers may experience their highest demand between 5:00 and 5:30
a.m. and 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. respectively. Assuming that their demands
are equal, they will both be charged the same "demand-component"
price. However, the cost to the utility may be as much as seven times
as great88 for the 5:00-5:30 p.m. peak-period demand as it is for the
off-peak 5:00-5:30 a.m. demand. Under time-of-day pricing, the costs
to the utility would be traced more closely since the price per kwh would
vary depending on the cost to serve at any given time.
There are, of course, several obstacles which must be removed
before this pricing scheme is implemented. First, a cost-benefit analysis
treatment of external costs by suggesting that a tax levied on the utility would be the
best way to reflect externalities in utility rates. That is, at least insofar as external costs
are concerned, the Wisconsin Commission felt that option A was most appropriate.
86. For a short but thorough discussion of time-of-day pricing and the data base
necessary for its implementation, see BERLIN, supra note 12, at 29-50.
87. The closest parallel in the United States to this type of pricing is, of course,
the long distance telephone tariff.
88. See BERLiN, supra note 12, at 39 n.9.
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must be completed before the feasibility of peak-load pricing can be de-
termined for small residential customers. The costs of metering may be
greater than the concomitant benefits of peak-load pricing for this class
of customer.89 In the first instance then, it is likely that residential
customers will be served under a time-of-day tariff on an experimental
basis only. On the more theoretical side, no United States utilities have
experience with the possible impediments of "shifting peaks" and
"needle peaks." "Shifting peaks" occur when customers respond to
time-of-day price differentials so completely that the system peak occurs
at previously off-peak times. This phenomenon can be avoided by proper
price differentials and timing periods. The difficulty is in determining
the appropriate price elasticities. "Needle peaks," when even peak con-
sumpton is not priced high enough to discourage usage,90 can likewise
be avoided through careful demand management. None of these prob-
lems should prove insurmountable.9 1
As was recognized by the Wisconsin Commission, the full imple-
mentation of marginal cost pricing is dependent upon time-of-day pric-
ing. Meanwhile, the Commission did implement an interim measure-
a winter-summer rate differential. 92 Although the winter-summer dif-
ferential falls far short of the type of demand management expected
from peak-load pricing, it evidences a commitment on the part of the
Commission to pursue a course of pricing reform consistent with an-
nounced principles. It is certain that this course of action, in particu-
lar, will be closely monitored by the various state regulatory commis-
sions as a potential prototype for their own pricing reforms.
C. The Economic Impact of Marginal Cost Pricing
To complete the analysis it is necessary to evaluate pricing reform
in terms of its economic impact. In that the overall impact of marginal
cost pricing is beneficial, the Wisconsin Commission was encouraged
to pursue pricing reform. Because harmful side-effects may result from
89. There are indications that this obstacle is being removed. See, e.g., Prefled
Testimony of William Vickery, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,
No.'s 20299 & 20299-A (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, filed April 18, 1974).
90. For instance, this phenomenon might occur on the hottest days of the year
when practically no price is high enough to encourage customers to turn off their air
conditioners.
91. They have not proved insurmountable in France where time-of-day pricing has
been in effect for the past 20 years. See MARGINAL COST PICING IN PRACTICE (J. Nelson
ed. 1964).
92. Since seasonal differential rates had already been experimented with in Wiscon-
sin, the Commission did have some experience with this "interim" reform. 1973 Wis.
PUB. SERV. COMT'N BIENNIAL REP. at 14.
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pricing reform of this type, the Commission was undoubtedly satis-
fied with an "interim" measure.
Potentially, the vested interests of all parties-utility management
and owners, environmentalists and customers - could be advanced by
pricing electricity at marginal cost. In so doing, the utility gains the
prospect of improved earnings since currently high costs of generation
will be recovered more directly from the users who are causing in-
creased loads. If the pricing scheme results in a short-term dampening
of demand, so much the better; the utilities' slavery to the capital mar-
kets may end. The implementation of peak load pricing promises a
better load factor and the concomitant increase in revenues. These fac-
tors assuredly were considered by MG&E which is currently in the
midst of generation expansion and only boasts of a 53%, load factor.0 3
To the environmentalists, pricing at cost is the start of a compre-
hensive plan of energy conservation and a backdoor approach toward
inhibiting utility expansion. If successful, pricing reform will diminish
the need for the environmentalist's participation in seemingly all-too-
frequent siting and certification hearings. 94
To customers, pricing at cost means a choice between absorbing
higher prices or conserving energy. Since "quantity discounts" no longer
are available within a given classification, economic incentives are now
built into the pricing system to encourage conservation. No longer will
attempts at conservation be punished by customer obligation to com-
pensate for a company's earnings erosion, often the undesired result of
voluntary conservation efforts.95
These results are all implict in any adoption of the principles of
marginal cost pricing. Since pricing at marginal cost, by definition,0 as-
sures the optimum allocation of resources, it is to be expected that the
problems which presently arise from a failure of the pricing system to
reflect costs will be eradicated.
Whatever the expected optimum results, however, there are
93. Load factor is the percent of total capacity used on average. MG&E's 53%
figure is significantly below the national average of 61%.
94. The primary motivation for their participation may stem from environmental
concern for the safety and feasibility of nuclear power.
95. This "catch-22" is a direct result of the declining block rate. Since energy
conservation attempts by individuals usually reduce consumption which would have been
priced at the relatively low "tail block" rate, only a small savings per kwh is experienced.
Moreover, reduced consumption in the short term only hurts the utility which must seek
rate relief in order to recover fixed costs. Therefore, energy conservation measures by
individuals in the most recent period have resulted in little or no decrease in their
energy costs. See ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION, A TIBM TO
CHOOsE 259 (1974); MG&E at 36 (Comm'r Cudahy, concurring).
96. However, the caveats expressed in note 36 supra must be considered.
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limitations to marginal cost pricing which, if not carefully considered,
will cause severe dislocations in the local economy. Three of these
limitations, perhaps the most important, should be considered.
First, while the economic relationship exigting between the average
and future costs of providing electric power is in the process of being
inverted, the rest of the economy still maintains a pre-inversion re-
liance on cheap electric power. A substantial change in rates which
occurs too quickly could produce severe economic dislocations affecting
the utility and its customers. The possibility of these short-term dis-
locations was noted by the New York State Public Service Commission
which recently received some rather harsh, firsthand experience in rate
revision. In a Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation case,97 decided
just five months after the New York Commission redesigned rates in
the Consolidated Edison9 s service territory, the New York Commission
rejected the rate reform proposals of Environmental Defense Fund
intervenors. The New York Commissioners feared that the combination
of price changes and voluntary conservation efforts would cause a
drastic lowering of energy consumption which in turn would make
it difficult for Niagara Mohawk to recover its fixed costs. 99 That is, the
utility could suffer severe earnings erosion and the "idle plant syn-
drome" in the short term. This particular factor did not present a bar-
rier to rate reform in Wisconsin,100 but it does help to explain the Wis-
consin Commission's reluctance to incorporate massive reforms too
quickly.
Second, if the price of electrical service is increased in one un-
anticipated step some customers may not be able to make the proper
response, namely, reduce energy consumption. Put another way, the
97. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Opinion No. 74-5, Case 26402 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, Feb. 5, 1974).
98. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Opinion No. 73-31, Case 26309 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, Sept. 26, 1973).
99. The N.Y. Commission expressed its fears in this way:
Staff and the company propose to obtain additional revenues required from
S.C. No. 1 [residential] by increasing the terminal block rates ....
The conservation of energy stemming from the fuel shortage results in
countervailing considerations. Each of the rate blocks, after the minimum, is
intended to recover some of the company's fixed costs as well as costs varying
with consumption. Consequently, increasing the portion of the fixed costs to be
recovered in the terminal block, in a period of reduced consumption, would
tend to aggravate the erosion of earnings since sales in the terminal block are
reduced first. . . . [W]e believe . . . that the present tilt in the company's
block rate structure [should] be maintained.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Opinion No. 74-5, Case 26402 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
Feb. 5, 1974).
100. MG&E at 36 (Comm'r Cudahy, concurring).
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price elasticity of demand for some customers over the short term may
be so low that it is impossible for them to adjust use in relation to
price. The alternatives then are to "waste" installed appliances (the
idle air conditioner or electrical heating system syndrome) or somehow
absorb what might be an unreasonably high price for electric service.
It is true that these two short-term effects could tend to offset one
another insofar as the utility is concerned. The customers with low
price elasticity of demand might compensate for other earning short-
falls. But, and this is a principal concern, those customers with the
greatest "pre-inversion" reliance on cheap electricity will be required to
suffer the most as a result of pricing reform. 01 The conclusion: short
of having perfect knowledge of consumption patterns, the regulators
necessarily could only take a go slow approach to rate reform.
Finally, fully implemented marginal cost pricing could have a
drastic effect on the low-income user. Since the low-income user is, in
many cases, a relatively large user of electricity10 2 and typically has a
low price elasticity of demand, 08 rate revision could seriously impede
the low-income user's ability to afford necessary power. This equity
problem does not appear to be solvable on the Commission level.10 4
The Commission could easily give price breaks to low-users, for ex-
ample, but it is not clear that low-income users would benefit. 10
101. Thus, it is a common conclusion that customers should be made aware of fu-
ture major changes in rates well before they will take effect. If proper notification is
made, customers can take steps to adjust their consumption habits accordingly.
102. "[P]erhaps 15 percent of the poor consume more than the average amount of
electricity, while the electricity consumption of some 20 percent of upper middle income
or more affluent customers is considerably below the average." Pace, The Poor, The
Elderly, and The Rising Cost of Energy, 95 Pun. UTIL. FORT., June 5, 1975, at 28. For a
comprehensive list of studies correlating electricity usage to various socioeconomic fac-
tors, see id. at 30.
103. "[R]elative to other Americans, the poor family has very little extra energy
to conserve." ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 95, at 123.
104. Commentators suggest a legislative response is necessary in order to appro-
priately meet the equity problem. Either an "energy-stamp" program (similar to the
"food stamp" subsidies) or simply supplemental cash grants are probably the only feasi-
ble methods of assuring that both the equity problem and the resource allocation/con-
servation goals of LRIC pricing are met.
105. Such a proposal is the "life-ine" rate concept. "Life-line" rates would price
the first 300 kwh or so of electricity at a relatively cheap rate. Consumption in excess of
this level would be priced at a proportionately higher rate to make up for the "low-
use" subsidy. The problem as pointed out in note 102 supra is that many "low-income"
users (perhaps 15%) would not be offered a "subsidized" rate whereas many affluent
customers would be "subsidized." Of course, as seen in note 84 supra & accompanying
text, "life-line" or other types of "inverted rates" might be economically justified under
certain conditions. The point here is that the "equity argument," by itself, does not lend
support to the "life-line" concept. Advocates of this concept should turn to appropriate
economic arguments to support their position. See, e.g., MG&E at 35-36.
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Moreover, the whole concept of subsidizing energy use of any class of
customers is abhorrent to the principle goals of marginal cost pricing. 16
In terms of economic impact alone, therefore, it should now be
clear why the Wisconsin Commission was content to implement only a
half-way pricing reform measure. What remains to be seen is whether
the steps necessary to attain full implementation of marginal cost
pricing will be taken with similar caution.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, the trend in electricity pricing will probably
follow the direction set by the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin.
First, there will be interim adoption of LRIC cost pricing, probably
with the practical variant of a flat rate per kwh charge, seasonal dif-
ferential, and, in some cases, slightly inverted residential rates.10 7 Grad-
ually, the results of the various feasibility studies and the issuance of
enabling legislation will indicate the more precise form of implemen-
tation. Indication of these future developments can be gleaned from the
increasing activity of various state and national environmental inter-
venors'0 8 and from the increasing recognition by the utilities themselves
of the importance of proper pricing strategy. 09
JAMES L. BLASIAK
106.
Equity actions by commissions should not include efforts to determine how
much customers can afford to pay, because this will reduce the effectiveness of
utility rates in properly allocating resources. It would also increase regulatory
work loads greatly.
Olson, supra note 13, at 33.
107. The municipally owned utility serving Seattle, Washington, has recently insti-
tuted "inverted rates." Jerabek, Reforming the Rates, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION, Feb. 15,
1975, at 4.
108. See, e.g., Order Instituting Investigation, Case 9804 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
issued Oct. 1, 1974); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., Case A54279 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
Sept. 16, 1975); Proceeding on motion of the Commission as to rate design for electric
corporations, Case 26806 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, case in progress); Pennsylvania Pub.
Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., Cases 20299 & 20299-A (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n,
March 25, 1975).
109. Although Mr. Willrich is not necessarily typical of utility management, he evi-
dences a growing awareness on management's part when he says the following:
What should now count most to an electric utility is financial survival,
and that depends on a sufficient rate of return. Given this recasting of the stra-
tegic issue-survival in the new energy situation, rather than growth in the old
situation-the tactics used by most utilities seem to lead them in the wrong
direction. Continued advocacy of a growth-inducing rate structure-declining
block rates-seems to be arguing against one's own economic interest.
Willrich, The Electric Utility and the Energy Crisis, Part II, 95 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan.
16, 1975, at 28.
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